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"To better understand the determinants of bank regulatory and supervisory 
policies and effective strategies for reforming those policies, future research 
should use case studies to trace the forces shaping the evolution of bank 
regulations and supervision.”1 
 
Regardless of the exceptionally deep recession that the financial meltdown 
brought about, the Great Recession has not been extraordinary.2 On the 
contrary, as the current crisis fundamentally originates from past decisions 
arguably tracing back for decades, all of the five economies concerned in this 
paper (UK, USA, Germany, Japan, and China), have a significant share in both 
triggering as well as exacerbating the current downturn. 
Subsequently, although it would be wrong to consider the Great Recession 
unique per se, the global financial crisis has nevertheless emphasized that the 
domestic economies affect each-other on a greater scale than ever before. At 
the same time, since the focus of this paper is on international financial 
regulations, the increasing inability to differentiate between the domestic and 
international economic variables, directly relates to the core of this paper. 
The numerous intergovernmental organizations such as the IMF, WTO, 
WB, OSCDE, and some regulatory initiatives (e.g. Basel Accord, IOSCO, 
IAIS)3 have not proven efficient enough. Mainly since their actual options are 
ultimately limited to the governments’ individual interests. While observing 
the G20 economies, the countries seem to have agreed that financial 
regulations are the source of mutual interest.4 Nevertheless, while looking at 
the policy outcomes, the cooperative atmosphere fades once compromises 
need decisive finalization. Therefore, several questions spark. Are the real 
economic interests genuinely mutual? And if not, does the economic status 
quo incentivize the creation of enhanced international financial regulations? 
 
1.1 Research Design 
  
The goal of this paper is to examine, whether the economic status quo 
incentivizes the creation of enhanced international financial regulations. 
Explicitly, five countries are studied: UK, USA, Germany, Japan, and China. 
While analyzing the crisis’ implications, the countries will be observed in pre- 
and post-crisis settings. 
While inspired by Barth, Caprio, and Levine, who see case studies as the 
best option for answering similar questions, this paper has chosen to study the 
                                               
1
 Barth, J. R., Caprio, G., and Levine, R. (2006). 
2
 See, for example: Bank of England (November 2009); The Warwick Commission (2009); 
Cohen, B. J. (2008); Nesvetailova A. (2008); and Wolf, M. (2008).  
3
 Kerwer, D. (2005), p. 615. 
4
 See, for example: Myung-bak, L (January 2010); Monck, A. (January 2010). 
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macro economic conditions of UK, USA, Germany, Japan, and China. First, 
after a brief literature review on generic trends in international financial 
regulations and an outline of research design, an assessment of the respective 
countries’ macro-economic conditions is provided. Next, dependent on the 
respective economies’ financial market structures, countries are divided into 
three groups: 1) Market-based United Kingdom and United States; 2) Bank-
based Germany and Japan; 3) Quasi-communist China. While using the groups 
for structured comparisons, three broad categories are chosen as gateways: 
 
1) Regulatory reform. Herein, the countries’ recent regulatory reforms will 
be observed, whereas emphasis will be placed on the internationally 
significant aspects of the reforms. The timeframe of the studied reforms 
depends on a country, but the study of past reforms does generally not date 
back more than twenty five years. 
 
2) An internationally distinguishing  variable. This category was chosen to 
bring out the different characteristics that the observed countries uniquely 
exhibit. As with the regulatory reform, the main criteria while choosing the 
respective denominators, has been the denominator’s relative importance for 
international financial regulations. 
 
3) Post-Crisis conditions. This section is an assessment of the respective 
countries’ economic conditions after the Great Recession. 
 
Ultimately, since the over-arching research question is whether the 
economic status quo incentivizes the creation of enhanced international 
financial regulations, the comparative assessment of the five economies is 
expected to offer better clarity for this matter. However, it must be noted that 
the paper does not claim to depict the entire range of denominators influencing 
the international financial system. Instead, while studying the economic 
determinants of the five economies, potential international challenges are 
identified, whereas the domestic leaderships’ genuine interest in a global 
resolution is studied. 
Thus, an over-arching research-question prevails: does the economic status 
quo incentivize the creation of enhanced international financial regulations? 
 
1.2 Generic Trends in International Financial Regulations 
 
The recent study by Bank of England concludes that “financial crisis has 
demonstrated the need for change” in the regulatory framework.5 Separately 
from the Bank of England, the arguments are supported by A. Baker, who 
argues that “renovating the concept of transgovernmentalism brings the 
participatory deficits in the current global financial architecture into sharp 
                                               
5
 Bank of England (2009), p. 3. 
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focus and points us in the direction of workable reform agenda that would 
expand inclusion and participation.”6 
Since the renovation of “transgovernmentalism” with regard to financial 
regulations purports enhanced coordination over regulatory measures, the 
crisis has certainly prepared the international stage for potential reforms. 
However, what is the actual financial architecture that demands redefined 
international cooperation? The literature suggests different interpretations. 
First, a traditional market-oriented approach divides the financial sector 
into three branches: banks, insurance, and securities’ industry.7 Herein, since 
the traditional division may not always accurately depict the structure of the 
modern financial industry, the recent literature tends to interpret the categories 
within a single framework, whereas the regulators arguably have failed to 
flexibly address the trend of convergence of the three branches. 
E.g. D. A. Singer considers such a failure as the main source of inadequate 
regulations- namely due to “asymmetric information” gathering, which so far 
has mostly been concerned with the banking sector.8 Furthermore, as Singer 
points out, since regulators are looking for “win-sets”- the conditions, where 
regulations are seen effective enough for guaranteeing stability- they are 
unlikely to adequately address the potential “information asymmetries” as long 
as there is no direct pressure from the markets. Furthermore, this is both true 
domestically as well for international regulators. 
From an international perspective, the regulators’ bias towards “win-sets” 
may cause regulatory “races to the bottom.” Singer brings the example of the 
rise of Japanese banks in the 1980s, when relatively lax regulations on 
Japanese banks created exogenous shocks, which in turn shifted the foreign 
regulators’ “win-sets” from their initial equilibriums, and thus created global 
pressures for deregulation.9 With regard to analyzing the regulatory fallacies 
that fed the creation of the recent meltdown, similar trends are noted. 
A. Nesvetailova argues that the public policy authorities “lost track of the 
real effects of financial deregulation” as the dominant criteria was to beat the 
competing markets with deregulation.10 Moreover, from the perspective of 
appropriate risk assessment, the information asymmetries impose another 
relevant shortfall. As Warwick Commission points out, the misconception that 
risk is solely “inherent in the characteristics of an asset or financial 
instrument” distorts the real picture, where credit, liquidity, and over-all 
market conditions may pose considerable risk. Since “different parts of the 
financial system have different capacities to hedge each type of risk”, the 
regulators often fail to preemptively address potential dangers within 
innovative instruments- such as it was the case with the MBSs in 2007.11 
                                               
6
 Baker, A. (2009), p. 195. 
7
 Singer, D. A. (2007), p. 10. 
8
 Singer, D. A. (2007), p. 13. 
9
 Singer, D. A. (2007), p. 27. 
10
 Nesvetailova A. (2008), p. 85. 
11
 The Warwick Commission (2009), p. 4. 
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N. Penny, while having a somewhat different focus, elaborates on the 
effect of high long-term interest rates, and disproportionately lax regulations 
of hedge funds. Again, since regulators’ unfortunate overemphasis of the 
banking sector has left the other financial institutions without reasonable 
supervision, the actual causes of crisis as argued by Penny- hedge funds- have 
repeatedly failed to “redeem some of the securities they had issued, which 
quickly led to global liquidity crisis.”12 As Penny points out, the recent MBS’ 
triggered crisis was not the first time, when hedge funds where the main 
sources of problem- so was the case with the 1998 bankruptcy of Long Term 
Capital Management, which according to Penny, had “the potential to 
destabilize the capital markets on a global scale.”13 Therefore, as the structural 
regulatory fallacies have been a long-term problem, it provides clear evidence 
for the regulators’ relative passiveness as long as their “win-set” is not in 
direct danger. 
For example, while briefly elaborating on some of the most important 
international regulatory initiatives affecting the financial industry, the Basel 
Accord stands out. After being introduced at the end of the 1980s, it quickly 
became one of the most important international regulatory initiatives- mostly 
due to the fact that it acquired the image as a “reputational mechanism.”14 
Today, despite the talks for implementing Basel III, most of the core 
requirements are still defined by Basel II (initially published in 2004), which 
from the regulatory perspective, focuses mostly on “pro-cyclical regulation.”15 
As argued by A. Korinek, however, since the pro-cyclical measures have 
failed to prevent the banks from excessive risk taking, the Basel Accord has 
not functioned efficiently.16 
Nevertheless, with regard to the initial accord, a more positive tone still 
prevails. For instance, a study observing the correlation between Effective 
Banking Supervision (BCP) and the banking sectors’ performance in 65 
countries from 1998 to 2002- time, when most of the Basel I was still 
effective- found “a direct positive effect of compliance with the BCP on 
banking sector performance.”17 Thus, although the pro-cyclical deregulation 
implemented by Basel II throughout the boom years proved to mislead the 
banking industry, the effectiveness of most of the Basel I measures provides a 
reasonably promising outlook for the Basel III as it is drafted. 
With regard to insurance and securities’ industries, there almost are no 
extensive initiatives for international regulations. As Singer points out the 
paradox of “information asymmetry” in financial regulations, he also notes 
that the relevant international regulatory institutions for insurance- and 
securities’ markets (IAIS, and IOSCO) are mostly marginal compared to the 
                                               
12
 Penny, N. (2008), p. 25. 
13
 Penny, N. (2008), p. 19. 
14
 Ho, D. E. (2002). 
15
 See, for example: Korinek, A. et al. (May 2009). 
16
 Korinek, A. (2009), p. 20. 
17
 Podpiera, R. (2006). 
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relevance of the Basel Accord.18 Hence, just as on domestic levels, the 
insurance- and securities-markets are often left without adequate attention, a 
similar fallacy is reflected on the international regulatory arena. 
In the following sections, five economies have chosen to be observed more 
closely. From the perspective of UK, USA, Germany, Japan, and China, the 
cross-country study will aim to go beyond the generics of international 
financial regulations. Ultimately, after assessing the over-all macro-economic 
conditions, and considering the five economies separately, the central research 
question will be aimed to have more comprehensive answers: does the 
economic status quo incentivize the creation of enhanced international 
financial regulations? 
 
2. Big Picture 
 
The goal of this section is to map the primary denominators that UK, USA, 
Germany, Japan, and China hold vis-à-vis the global financial regulations. 
Herein, not all the variables are attempted to identify. Instead, the focus is on 
variables that possibly impact the respective economies’ ability and interest in 
shaping international financial regulations. Therefore, firstly, the extent of the 
countries’ international economic influence will be assessed; and secondly, the 
structure of the domestic financial systems next to the countries’ economies 
will generally be observed.   
 While simply using the countries’ GDP measures (see Graph 2.1) for 
reference, the US’ GDP has performed the strongest throughout the first 
decade of the 21st century. From 1999 to its peak in 2008, it gained about $5 
trillion, whereas enlarging the already huge gap with the follow-ups: Japan, 
China, Germany, and UK, respectively. Therefore, if only GDP measures were 
considered, the American interest would most likely have the predominant 
stance. 
 From another perspective, while considering trade patterns as measures 
of economic power, the American dominance is not as clear-cut. While the US 
and UK had current account deficits throughout the past decade, the Chinese, 
German, and Japanese applicable figures were almost their mirror images (see 
Graph 2.2; Graph 2.3). This phenomenon is elaborated by M. Wolf and his 
“savings glut theory.” Briefly, he draws the link between the American 
“consumer of last resort” mentality and the export-accumulated wealth of 
China, Germany and Japan.19 Furthermore, as he argues that the net exporting 
economies, especially China, accumulate foreign reserves, this creates global 
imbalances, and is potentially a major source of financial instability (discussed 
further under the section explicitly considering China). 
                                               
18
 Singer, D. A. (2007), p. 73. 
19
 Wolf, M. (2008), p. 152. 
5
Moora: Global Crisis and Financial Regulations: Who Determines What?
Published by W&M ScholarWorks, 2010
Graph 2.1: GDPs in Billions of Dollars20 
 
Source: IMF Principal Global Indicators. 
 
Graph 2.2: Percentages of Net Exports of Goods per GDP (2005-2009)21 
 
Source: IMF Principal Global Indicators. 
 
Graph 2.3: Current Account Surpluses (1999- 3rd Quarter 2009)22 
 
Source: IMF Principal Global Indicators. 
                                               
20
 GDPs are nominal, seasonally adjusted (except China). For China, the trend of 3 Quarters’ 
average was used  for the 2009 aggregate GDP. 1 Yuan = .1464 USD was used. 
21
 Exports are expressed in terms of free on board units (f. o. b.). 
22
 Balance of Payment Statistics. ‘09 figure is from the 3rd Quarter . No data for China in ‘09. 
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M. Wolf’s perspective is supported by B. J. Cohen, who argues that 
“the balance between states and markets […] is being dramatically altered” as 
the result of financial globalization, which has caused severe unbalances 
between the nations that borrow and save.23 From the prism of determining 
relevant macroeconomic impacts on enhancing international financial 
regulations, the frictions between saving- and borrowing nations may indeed 
pose multiple implications (for reference, see Table 2.1). 
 




From a rather different approach, while observing the nature of 
respective financial systems, several characteristics can be noted. With regard 
to UK, for example, her financial industry has been the primary source of 
British economic power for the past three to four decades. In 1993, as 
presented by Table 2.2, the UK’s banking assets accounted for 259 percent of 
her GDP, whereas the ratios for Germany, Japan and USA were 152, 150, and 
53 percent, respectively. More importantly, while observing the British Equity 
market capitalization (EMC) relative to her GDP, the ratio was at 140 percent. 
Note that the next highest EMC to GDP ratio was held by the US with 82 
percent. Although these figures are from 1993, this highlights the vast impact 
that UK has had on the global financial system. 
 
Table 2.2: Financial Markets Relative to GDP25 
 
 
Herein, the latter provides rather significant connotations. Due to the 
market-based characteristics, both the UK’s and the US’ ownership structures 
provide higher rates of liquidity than other markets considered in this paper.26 
This is supported by the study conducted by Antoniou et al. (2008), which 
compares the capital structures of companies across the OECD countries, and 
                                               
23
 Cohen, B. J. (2008), p. 14. 
24
 Braga, C. A. P. (November 2009). 
25
 The table was first presented by Kwock, C. Y., and Tadesse, S. (2006), p. 228. 
26
 Mayer, C. (2008). 
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concludes that capital markets are a significant part for both the US’ and UK’s 
businesses, whereas this is notably not the case for markets that are 
traditionally more ownership oriented (e.g. Germany and Japan).27 
In the cases of Germany and Japan, at the same time, the latter implies that 
the foundations of the two economies’ financial systems are rather similar. 
This, for example, is supported by Bebenroth et al. (2008), who have analyzed 
the supervisory differences between the two countries due to the fact that both 
German and Japanese systems are heavily based on banking sectors.28 
Therefore, from the perspective of shaping the framework for the 
following case studies, UK and US as the samples of market-based financial 
systems, will be observed within a single group. Next, since Germany and 
Japan both have bank-based financial systems, they will also be observed as a 
uniform case. And lastly, due to the quasi-communist nature of China, which 
rather lacks the traits of a neo-liberal economy, the emerging economic power 
will be considered as a separate case study. 
All in all, due to the highly complex nature of all the five economic 
systems, the following sections will not claim to grasp a complete picture, nor 
will they claim to completely answer whether international cooperation could 
enhance financial regulations. Instead, the focus will be on incorporating the 
applicable macroeconomic denominators, and studying the literature-
concerning aspects concerning financial regulations. Ultimately, this is 
expected to prove most effective in providing possible answers to the central 
research question: does the economic status quo incentivize enhanced 
international financial regulations? 
 





Against International Regulatory 
Reform: 
UK 
Stable financial industry key 
for economy; Market-based 
financial system; Global 
leader in regulatory 
convergence and 
deregulation. 
Asymmetric global risk on financial 
industry. 
USA 
Stable financial industry key 
for economy; Market-based 
financial system; Global 
competition for the dominant 
economic power. 
Asymmetric global risk on financial 
industry; Global competition for the 
dominant economic power. 
 
                                               
27
 Antoniou, A., Guney, Y. and Paudyal, K. (March 2008), p.86. 
28
 See section 4.1, where the study is mentioned as German regulatory reforms are discussed. 
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As the market-based financial model is distinctive to the Anglo Saxon 
economies, the British and American vibrant financial centers (London, New 
York) have arguably been leading the global market, whereas China, Germany 
and Japan have rather been the second-tier, although crucial, participants.29 
 The following section will consider the regulatory reforms that the 
American and British economies witnessed before the recent crisis. Next, the 
financial industry as the Anglo Saxon key economic sector distinguishing UK 
and USA internationally will be discussed on a broader perspective, which 
will then be followed by a discussion on the countries’ post-crisis economic 
conditions. 
 
3.1 Regulatory Reform 
 
Despite most of the financial denominators, the process of regulatory reforms 
sets the Anglo Saxon economies rather apart. As noted by Llewellyn (2000), 
the UK’s regulatory framework has been among the “most liberal systems 
around the world” ever since the Big Bang reforms were introduced in 1987,30 
whereas the American regulatory framework has not followed the trend of 
regulatory convergence. Under this section, first, an overview of the UK’s 
regulatory reforms will be given, which will then be followed by the American 
regulatory trends. 
Within the global financial system, UK became the first market to 
allow a single institution to conduct business “between the main areas of 
commercial banking, securities trading, and insurance.” Consequentially, as 
Llewellyn argues, “the UK structure has been described as financial 
conglomeration rather than universal banking,” which in turn has paved the 
way for global deregulatory pressures and convergence of financial 
institutions.31 
Until the recent crisis, the process of liberalization seemed to benefit 
the British economy on a vast scale. While being eager to lead the way in 
converging supervisory institutions to a single regulatory agency, the newly 
elected Labor government of 1997 announced “a total reorganization of the 
institutional structure of financial regulation”.32 The result of this initiative 
was the formation of Financial Stability Agency (FSA). Almost instantly, FSA 
became the most powerful regulator in the world (since the potentially bigger 
regulatory framework within USA had not followed the trend of regulatory 
convergence, nor, as discussed later, has it done so today). 
Therefore, just as was the case with the follower countries- Germany 
and Japan- this was initially seen to benefit the British financial sector via 
exploitation of economies of scale, transparent regulation, and avoidance of 
                                               
29
 See, for example: Kwock, C. Y., and S. Tadesse (2006). 
30
 Llewellyn, D. T. (2000). 
31
 Llewellyn, D. T. (2000), p. 309-310. 
32
 Llewellyn, D. T. (2000), p. 311. 
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contradictory measures by overlapping regulatory agencies.33 However, after 
the recent crisis sparked, the process of convergence and deregulation seemed 
to have stretched too far.34 Subsequently, the crisis came as a surprise, and the 
regulators did not manage to provide comprehensive responses to the crisis 
before early 2009 (when the UK’s Banking Act was announced in February 
2009).35 
 According M. Hall (2009), the Special Resolutions Regime, which was 
enacted under the Banking Act of 2009, was the first step in the row of many 
that financial regulators needed to take to once again meet the “top priority” of 
public policy. The SRR only contemplated the framework for dealing with 
problematic financial institutions, it did not provide the tools that regulators 
need for actual prudential measures. For example, Hall discusses the need to 
properly “calibrate” micro- as well as macro-prudential policy so that 
“systemic risk” and “inherent pro-cyclicality in the financial system” could be 
reduced.36 This means more supervision, but also smarter and efficiently 
drafted regulations- a conclusion that several authorities have made (e.g. Bank 
of England and the Warwick Commission as discussed earlier).37 
Just as with regard to UK, the American regulators reported their first 
comprehensive responses to the crises no earlier than 2009. Herein, the US 
Department of Treasury’s White Paper on financial regulatory reform would 
perhaps be one of the most significant milestones. In its outline, the 
Department of Treasury conceives the government’s previous regulatory 
shortfalls: “while the crisis had many causes, it is clear now that the 
government could have done more to prevent many of the problems from 
growing out of control and threatening the stability of our financial 
stability.”38 
With regard to the previous regulatory short-falls, they note similar 
aspects that several scholars have concluded (for example, the information 
asymmetries for non-depository institutions that essentially conduct the same 
business than banks, but are not subject to as restrictive rules). Subsequently, 
the White Paper proposes six key steps for overcoming the asymmetries: “A 
new Financial Services Oversight Council of financial regulators to identify 
emerging systemic risks and improve interagency cooperation; New authority 
for the Federal Reserve to supervise all firms that could pose a threat to 
financial stability, even those that do not own banks; Stronger capital and 
other prudential standards for all financial firms, and even higher standards for 
large, interconnected firms; A new National Bank Supervisor to supervise all 
federally chartered banks; Elimination of the federal thrift charter and other 
loopholes that allowed some depository institutions to avoid bank holding 
                                               
33
 Llewellyn, D. T. (2000), p. 312. 
34
 See, for example, Gieve, Sir J. (2008). 
35
 Hall, M. J. B. (2009). 
36
 Hall, M. J. B. (2009), p. 53. 
37
 For more detail, see Section 1.2 on pages 4 and 5. 
38
 Department of the Treasury, (2009), p. 2. 
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company regulation by the Federal Reserve; The registration of advisers of 
hedge funds and other private pools of capital with the SEC.”39 
For the most part, as the American market-based system is favoring 
minimal state intervention, the fear for “big government” under such proposals 
is relatively quick to emerge. And while taking a look at the lobby of financial 
corporations, the industry is already working against the potential overhaul of 
financial markets.40 However, given the extent of market failure under too 
little regulation, the government is ambitious to move forward. 
Herein, on a broader level, the White paper also outlines five key 
objectives that should guide the future drafts of financial regulations. Briefly, 
the objectives concentrate around “robust supervision and regulation of 
financial markets”, prevention of financial abuse, equipping the government 
with effective financial crisis management mechanisms, and raising 
“international regulatory standards” by improving international cooperation.41 
All in all, the Obama Administration’s controversial preference for 
greater government intervention is quite clear. Nevertheless, since the 
American financial system is the biggest in the world, the international 
cooperation will certainly not work effectively unless the US is determined to 
contribute. Thus, after reviewing the regulatory reforms that the Obama 
Administration is proposing, it can likely be concluded that the international 
markets are probably more inclined towards genuine cooperation than it was 
the case before the crisis. 
 Conclusively, despite the recent setbacks, UK and USA have 
historically been the hallmarks for a well-functioning financial system- and are 
likely to remain this way for a rather long period. This will most likely be also 
true with regard to creating the trends for global regulatory reforms. Herein, in 
order to understand the probable national interests, the key priorities with 
regard to the global financial system need to be addressed. While attempting to 
do so, the next section will consider the two economies’ financial industries 
more closely, whereas the remaining section will observe their post-crises 
conditions. 
 
3.2 Financial Industry 
 
Due to the interconnectedness of the financial markets and the real economy, 
the Anglo Saxon strategic interest in stable global financial markets is quite 
explicit. In case of the UK, for example, the share of financial services to her 
GDP rose to 9.4 in 2006.42 In the US, at the same time, the highest Rates of 
Return on Sector-Specific Capital are reported within sectors such as 
“Securities, commodity contracts, and investments” (92%), “Insurance carriers 
                                               
39
 Department of the Treasury, (2009), p.3. 
40
 See, for example: Eggen, D. (2010). 
41Department of the Treasury, (2009), p. 3 – 4.  
42
 Swain, S. (2008). 
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and related activities” (36%), and “Funds, trusts, and other financial vehicles” 
(12%)- in short, within areas closely intertwined with the financial industry.43 
Handa and Kahn (2008), while studying the financial market’s 
importance, characterize the effect of intertwined characteristics of financial 
development and economic growth as a “symbiotic relationship”, which, if 
properly managed, could significantly benefit both financial and non-financial 
sectors.44 Via econometric analysis, they conclude that the co-integration 
between financial and non-financial sectors is expected to provide a strong 
correlation “between the financial sector and GDP”. 
In fact, they note that as the result of the model, “a more immediate 
impact” between the GDP and financial sector is expected to be shown for the 
US’ and UK’s co-integration variables than for any of the other economies in 
the study (which among several other countries, also includes Germany and 
Japan).45 With regard to the Anglo Saxon financial industry, this is another 
affirmation that while drafting financial regulations, the wellbeing of the 
British and American financial sectors will be the economies’ primary concern 
since it correlates closely with the economic interests of all the other sectors. 
Herein, the co-integration of the financial sector and the real economy 
has been subject to several studies. Explicitly in relation to UK’s and US’ 
financial industries, both volatility as well as greater relative shares of the 
respective financial industries within the countries’ macro economies, have 
most likely contributed towards the facilitation of co-integration. 
For example, according to C. Mayer (2008), most of the British market 
volatility comes from the significant role of the UK’s stock market, and the 
developed ownership structures that only the US can match. With regard to 
UK, only 16 percent of the largest 170 listed companies have a single 
shareholder owning more than 25 percent of the company, whereas only 6 
percent of the largest companies have a single majority shareholder. If 
comparing the figures to Germany, the contrast is remarkable: nearly 80 
percent of top 170 German companies have a single shareholder owning at 
least 25 percent of the company.46 
The link between the unique liquidity of the British and American 
stock exchanges, ownership structures, and financial industries’ importance is 
another aspect that highlights the strategic importance of this particular 
industry for UK and US. Since single shareholders are more likely to hold 
long positions, whereas dispersed ownership rather increases the participation 
of mutual funds, insurance companies, investment banks and other financial 
institutions, the Anglo Saxon financial industry is by design globally attracting 
more financial market participants than Germany, Japan or China. Hence, in 
times of volatility, their financial industry will also affect the real economy 
more than the economies not holding as volatile market characteristics. 
                                               
43
 Fisher, E. O’N., and  Marshall, K. G. (May 2008), p. 48 
44
 Handa, J., and Khan, S. R. (2008). 
45
 Handa, J. , and Khan, S. R. (2008), p.1043. 
46
 Mayer, C. (2008), p. 619. 
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Conclusively, since the financial markets are rather global in nature, it 
might not be as reasonable to go too much into detail while comparing 
different domestic market characteristics. However, since the vibrant financial 
industry is an integral part of the Anglo Saxon economies, the US’ and UK’s 
economic strategies will certainly consider the wellbeing of their financial 
markets among first priorities. Therefore, with regard to international financial 
regulations, it is certainly in their interest to have stabile and commonly agreed 
upon regulatory arrangements. Nevertheless, this might not mean that in 
reality, the explicit regulatory framework, which is suitable for the American 
or British financial industry, would be reasonable for the Chinese quasi-





Similarly to most of the developed economies, the recent crisis has drastically 
weakened both the British and American economic prospects. Among several 
issues, the British fiscal position has worsened in a quick pace. While looking 
at Table 1.1, it can be noted that UK’s public debt increased from 44.1 percent 
in 2007 to 68.6 percent of GDP in 2009. The equivalent readings for the US 
are from 63.1 percent to 88.8 percent, respectively. Furthermore, the debt ratio 
is projected to reach more than 100 percent for UK and more than 112 percent 
for US by 2014. 
For UK, this would mean more than doubling the British national debt 
within only 7 years, whereas for the US, the country’s economy would hold by 
far the highest debt in the World, if the face value is considered. Cecchetti et al 
(2010), while estimating the impact of drastically increased debt levels 
throughout the industrial world, conclude that the Anglo Saxon current path, 
as is the case for Germany, Japan, is unsustainable.47 Therefore, since the 
public sector’s debt is likely to impact the efficiency of British and American 
economic recovery (instead of raising taxes and lowering investments, now 
should ideally be the time for the government to compensate for private 
sector’s lack of consumption), the countries’ prospects are not as bright.  
 With regard to enhancing financial regulations, as the Obama 
Administration, and the British financial authorities, have presented, the 
governments seem to be determined to reduce the influence that the financial 
institutions have both on the American and British economies. This is also true 
internationally, as the G20 nations have been meeting regularly to coordinate 
government action for tackling the aftermath of the Great Recession. Herein, 
apart from the looming budget deficits, the US’ dispute with one of their main 
trading partners- China- would perhaps be a relevant area worthy to follow in 
the post-crisis world. 
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 As the Chinese fixed exchange rate (discussed under the section 
concerning China) is seen to hurt the American economic interest, this could 
potentially create the next international dispute.48 From the US side accusing 
China of exchange rate protectionism, and China disliking the US’ pressure, 
the risk for an international conflict, and a potential trade war, is certainly 
there. Although it must be noted that within the past few months, some of the 
heated rhetoric has been downgraded, there are still several areas of concern, 
including global financial stability, for why the post-crisis US – China 
relations have received notable international attention. 
 Additionally, while analyzing the potential economic determinants that 
could contribute towards enhancing the global financial system, the Chinese 
potential competition for the World’s dominant economic power could be one 
of the areas, where competition between the US and China may unbalance the 
rather fragile atmosphere. As depicted on Table 4.1 under the section 
discussing Japan, China has already surpassed Japan and is approaching the 
American GDP figures rather fast (being currently at nearly 40 percent of the 
US GDP). 
 Moreover, since the US economic growth will likely be rather weak 
due to both the private and public sector’s debt burdens, the gap between 
China and USA is likely to decrease further. Therefore, overall, the post-crisis 
American economic dominance is probable to gradually decrease, whereas 
several emerging economies, especially in Asia, will gain some of the 
advantages that America has held so far. This, however, does not mean that 
the American economy would become irrelevant. On the contrary, as 
discussed above, the US is still by far the main “player” on the global market. 
All in all, from the Anglo Saxon perspective, the post crisis priority is 
to reverse the economy back to growth. In short term, this primarily requires 
prudent fiscal measures, which at the same time, demands effectively quitting 
the government’s liquidation programs. In the longer term, since the financial 
industry holds the key position for UK and US, it is in the countries’ firsthand 
economic interest to enhance the financial regulatory system- both 
domestically and internationally. Therefore, while asking whether the post-
crisis Anglo Saxon system has considerable incentives for enhancing 
international financial regulations, it is probably more likely to do so than any 
of the subsequently analyzed economies- China, Germany, Japan. 
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 4. Germany and Japan  
 
  





Eurozone; Bank-based financial 
system; Pro regulatory 
convergence and deregulation. 
 
Japan 
Competition with China and 
South-East Asia; Pro regulatory 
convergence and deregulation. 
Competition with UK and USA 
over the global financial 
centers;. 
 
Since both the German and Japanese financial systems are largely bank-based, 
they are often compared to each-other. As discussed under the Big Picture 
section, there are several key reasons for why Germany and Japan hold 
common strategic positions within the World economy next to the market-
based Anglo Saxon, and quasi-communist Chinese models. 
The following sections will therefore study the German and Japanese 
regulatory reforms, which have both moved towards institutional convergence, 
in a comparative setting. Thereafter, a look will be taken on the economies’ 
internationally distinguishing variables and subsequent post-crisis conditions. 
 
4.1 Regulatory Reforms 
 
For both Japan and Germany, as for UK, one of the major issues regarding 
regulatory reforms has been the integration of supervision on insurance, 
banking, and securities industries. As these industries have become 
increasingly intertwined and therefore nearly impossible to separate between 
each-other, the British leadership in converging the regulatory bodies has been 
followed. In this section, first, a look at the core of German regulatory reforms 
will be taken, followed by a look at the Japan’s applicable reforms. In the 
succeeding section, the internationally distinguishing variables will be studied- 
Eurozone for Germany, and the Asian regional competition for Japan. Lastly, 
a look at the two economies post-crisis conditions will be taken. 
With regard to Germany’s regulatory reforms, particularly, M. Schüler 
from ZEW Mannheim49 discusses how Germans have followed the global 
“trend of integrated financial supervision” ever since the Bundesanstalt für 
Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (BaFin)50 was established in May 2002.51 
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Additionally, Pellerin et al (2009) write how Japan and UK have undergone a 
similar “consolidation” process, whereas the US might soon follow the path.52 
With regard to Germany, particularly, the creation of BaFin 
represented significant changes- although the implications are multifaceted. 
Instead of having three parallel authorities, a single financial regulator, solely 
responsive to the German Minister of Finance, was founded. Since the 
regulations gained efficiency via reduced bureaucracy, and the framework 
became considerably better to comprehend, the immediate impacts were 
mostly seen positive.53 
M. Schüler (2004), for example, enlists some of the positive 
implications briefly after BaFin was established: “Unification allows the 
realization of cost savings through economies of scale; the superiority 
structure should reflect the integration of financial sectors; regulatory arbitrage 
can be avoided; accountability is enhanced; and international co-operation is 
fostered.” Ultimately, the new regulatory framework became able to cope with 
“the blurring of borders between banks, insurers and financial service 
providers”54. Nevertheless, Schüler also leaves room for skepticism by 
outlining some of the downsides: “Unification could lead to lack of clarity; an 
integrated agency could suffer from diseconomies of scale; concentration of 
power could vitiate democratic policies; and moral hazard concerns could be 
extended across the whole financial sector.”55 
From the prism of a more recent study- Bebenroth et al (2008), which 
compares the Japanese and German banking regulations- the German 
regulatory model stands considerably efficient.56 Among other aspects, they 
refer to the IMF stress tests, which analyzed the German banking sector in 
2003. Based on Bebenroth et al, “the stress tests were done for a significant 
increase in a borrower’s probability of default (of 30% and 60%, respectively), 
for a 30% decline in stock market prices within a period of one month, for a 
significant shift in the yield curve, and for a 15% exchange rate change of the 
Euro against the US-Dollar within one month. Moreover, macro stress tests 
were conducted which assumed that several risk factors were positively 
correlated.”57 Eventually, the conclusion was that the tests “did not indicate a 
risk to the stability of the German banking system.”58 
In the case of Japan, while the economy was suffering under enduring 
stagnation, the “Big Bang” financial reforms were initiated in late 1996.59 
During the “Big Bang” reforms, which according to Dekle (1998) copied the 
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London’s radical reforms from late 1980s, the Japanese financial system 
aimed to compete with the global financial centers of New York and London. 
Among several other policy-steps, a “financial supervisory regime more 
consistent with deregulation” was introduced. 
According to Dekle, the “Big Bang” did indeed seem promising in 
shaking up laggard markets, and inducing the financial sector towards stronger 
performance. However, the reforms were not going far enough as several 
issues were yet to be solved (e.g. government’s flawed intermediation between 
borrowers and lenders; problems with “devising tax measures that are 
consistent with financial deregulation; and establishing a clear, rules-based 
exit strategy for failing financial firms”). 
Today, despite the initially high hopes, it is widely known that most of 
the “Big Bang” failed. Okomato, I. (2005) elaborates on some of the reasons 
by referring to the system’s “inability to go beyond liberalizing the securities 
industry by challenging the government’s protection of the banking sector, and 
to the government’s haphazard intervention in the stock market.”60 To some 
extent, the turbulent macroeconomic factors could be blamed. On the other 
hand, as Hoshi and Kashyap note, the “financial sector problems seem too big 
to be explained by purely cyclical factors”.61 
Therefore, Hoshi and Kashyap refer to the “conscious policy of 
Japanese banks to keep extending credit to firms even when the prospects for 
being repaid are limited”. Moreover, they argue that the banks’ willingness to 
issue such loans was caused by the regulatory environment, which in reality, 
simply prevented failing companies from exiting the market. Subsequently, 
over the two decades, the scholars argue that the Japanese economy lost up to 
20 percent of its GDP.62 
From the perspective of evaluating the effect of regulatory reforms, 
such a conclusion is certainly devastating. And from the regulator’s lens, they 
seem to have taken the blame. E.g. Ito Takashi (Ministry of Finance) discusses 
that “regulators felt justified in providing less-than-candid estimates [while 
concerning] the magnitude of the non-performing loan problem”. He goes 
further: “when the problem became more serious (say by 1994), the reluctance 
became more a fear that a systemic crisis might result from full disclosure.”63 
Along the same lines, M. Imai (2009) discusses that the bank failures 
in Japan during 1999-2002 (right after the Asian crisis) were exacerbated by 
the regulators’ “tendency to delay declarations of insolvency in prefectures 
that supported senior politicians of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party 
(LDP).”64 Ultimately, he concludes that “politicization of bank insolvency 
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resolution might be one of the fundamental problems that one must take into 
account when designing bank regulation and supervision”.65 
When asking, whether the lessons of “Great Stagnation” were learned, 
the literature hints on various conclusions. E.g. Pellerin, et al. (2009) 
emphasize the convergence process of various regulatory institutions, which as 
with Germany, was also an important trend in Japan.66  Specifically, they 
argue that as the Japanese Financial Services Authority was emerged into a 
consolidated regulator between 1998 and 2000, the “transition […] was more 
dramatic than in many other countries because the Ministry of Finance (MOF) 
held significant regulatory power prior to reform.”67 
Conclusively, the 2000s’ tendency to gather insurance, banking, and 
securities regulators under a “single roof” has been dominant in most of the 
developed economies (including Japan, Germany, and UK). Nevertheless, this 
does not mean that such reforms have abolished international discrepancies 
within the structure and role of regulatory agencies. Especially due to China, 
which, as discussed later, may potentially undermine the efficiency of global 
financial regulations. 
 
4.2 Eurozone and Germany 
 
Before discussing the implications of the crisis on Germany, in order to 
adequately grasp the determinants of the German financial system, its leading 
role in the Euro area remains to be analyzed. 
Cohen and Subacchi elaborate on the fact that despite euro’s broad 
scope in terms of covering European markets, it is “largely a passive 
participant in global payments developments and remains a weak force in 
monetary diplomacy.” For Germany- the biggest economy within the 
Eurozone- such short-falls are no doubt costly. One of the major sources of 
excess cost is the controversy between fiscal policies, which differ across the 
euro-area’s member states; and monetary policy, which is conducted by the 
European Central Bank- a single authority across EMU. Due to the unnatural 
segregation of these economic policy mechanisms, Cohen and Subacchi call 
the phenomena “A one-and-a-half-currency-system”. Subsequently, for the 
German financial system, the “semi-currency” characteristics propagate 
external risks, and pose excess costs (as currently illustrated by the Greek 
budget crisis). 
 S. Dullien, and U. Fritsche add another perspective, while noting in 
the Journal of Post Keynesian Economics that “the increasing macroeconomic 
imbalances within the European Monetary Union (EMU)” have “coincided” 
with the fiscal discrepancies of the South-European deficit-running nations 
and the German budget surpluses. While focusing their analysis on measuring 
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divergence in unit labor cost throughout EMU, and the USA, they conclude 
that the budget deficit nations (such as Spain, Portugal, Greece) exhibit 
increased unit labor costs above their long term average. This in turn poses 
potential risks for the entire financial system, which obviously interconnects 
Germany and other member states throughout the EMU68. 
Furthermore, after the Greek default on its debt became more likely, 
the German system- as the main source of stability for Eurozone- has had no 
other option but to contribute towards the Greek bailout. Subsequently, as 
Joschka Fischer (2010) points out, Germany “is withdrawing into its shell”, 
which implies that costs of divergence within Eurozone are beginning to 
reduce the German willingness to invest into euro’s stability outside its own 
borders69. 
Ultimately, in the context of this paper, the Eurozone’s intertwined 
nature makes Germany unique. China, Japan, UK, and USA all have explicit 
control over their fiscal and monetary policies. Since Germany lacks similar 
measures over these two variables, the nature of Eurozone may pose a 
potential source of conflicting interests- especially while considering key 
interests in enhancing global financial regulations. 
 
4.3 Asian Competition and Japan 
 
By 2000s, after the “slow moving financial crisis” peaked with the 1997-1998 
financial crises, the Japanese macro economy was vastly unstable.70 As 
presented by M. Fukao (2007), the duration of the financial crisis introduced a 
longstanding period of deflation and forfeited output. Although Fukao calls the 
era a “lost decade” for the Japanese economy, and hence for its role within the 
Asian region, he marks some signs for a potential “comeback” between 2003 
and 2006- mainly due to “strong recovery of stock prices”.71 
However, while the boom-time improvements helped the Japanese 
economy to shift towards growth, the competing nations still grew faster. This 
is especially true with regard to the Japan’s regional competitors- e.g. China. 
As seen from Graph 2.2 and Graph 2.3, the main engine for higher growth- net 
exports- was growing at a much faster rate in China than in Japan. Moreover, 
although Japan remained the second biggest economy during the boom-times, 
it is estimated to surrender the position to China in 2010 (Table 4.1). 
In retrospect, several structural shortfalls, including financial, can be 
blamed for the Japan’s inability to pick up sustainable growth for nearly two 
decades. For example, Lee and Kwak (2009) compare the fast-growing 
Korean economy to the Japanese, and ask whether the growth discrepancies 
rely on Korean neo-liberal reforms, whereas the Japanese system has remained 
unchanged. Although they conclude that further empirical evidence is needed 
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to pinpoint explicit reasons, they agree with the “academic consensus” that the 
Japanese system is not flexible enough to face the growing Asian competition. 
T. Albrecht (2005), for instance, estimates the next probable 
“economic center of Asia” in 20 years, and concludes based on “GNP-
weighted centrality indices” that Japan’s decline will be “more than offset” by 
China’s “significant increase”.72 Subsequently, he argues, that “the total 
economic weight of Northeast Asia is likely to decrease slightly compared 
with Southeast Asia and Greater India over the next 20 years. On the 
worldwide stage, Northeast Asia as a whole will grow in importance, although 
less quickly than Greater India and Southeast Asia.”73 
All in all, as Japan has been subject to thorough research over the 
recent decade, most of the literature concerning Japan’s performance in the 
2000s has considered the impact of the ‘90s Asian crisis. After the recent 
financial crisis struck, however, the outlook for Japan has changed. Hence, the 
following section will briefly consider the new post-crisis conditions for both 
of the bank-based financial systems- Germany and Japan. 
Table 4.1 China’s GDP versus Japan’s GDP as a percent of US GDP 
 
Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit 
 
4.4 Post-Crisis Germany 
 
After the crisis struck, and the markets went downfall in October 2008, the 
preventative stress tests, as conducted on the German financial system by IMF 
in 2003, became real world scenarios. Moreover, in several cases, the stress 
tests turned out overly optimistic. As discussed by Dieter Heribert (2009), the 
German response to the crisis was often “hastily implemented and lacked a 
coherent strategy”.74 This was foremost caused by the German banks’ 
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exposure to the US subprime mortgage markets via their investments into the 
US subprime businesses. 
In more detail, I. Hardie and D. Howarth (2009) from University of 
Edinburgh have studied the crisis’ impact on the German financial sector, 
while asking “why did the supposedly more protectionist and conservative 
German banking system […] suffer much higher losses?”75 They refer to 
IMF’s July 2009 statistics, according to which “9 percent of total global write-
downs” accounted for German depository institutions. Furthermore, they note 
that the majority of the losses were taken by large German government-owned 
banks- known as the German Landesbanken (LB).76 
Matin F. Hellwig (2009) characterizes the pre-crisis situation as 
German state-owned banks “sponsoring American entities, so called ‘conduits’ 
and ‘structural investment vehicles’ that invested large amounts of money in 
subprime-mortgage-backed securities”77. Hellwig sees the cause of such 
reckless “sponsoring” in the preceding decade of low interest rates (real and 
nominal), and “of low interest margins for financial intermediaries”, which 
ultimately caused what he calls a “yield panic”78- the investors’ necessity to 
cover operating costs from what they earned. 
Once the European Commision “banned the state guarantees” for 
refinancing, as Hellwig points out, the German state-owned banks’ appetite for 
MBS’ high yield became even bigger. Hence, the stage was set rather fragile 
for the upcoming collapse. When the crisis indeed hit after the MBS suppliers 
started to go bust, the German financial sector was already too attached. 
Hellwig brings the example of two multibillion depository institutions- 
Industriekreditbank (IKB) and Sächsichse Landsebank- which both would not 
have survived unless the local authorities would not have bailed them out79. 
While seeking the reasoning for such underperformance in the German 
state-owned banks throughout the crisis, several conclusions can be made. H. 
Harald, and T. Marcel (2009), for instance, see one of the main reasons in the 
biographies of the manager. As they studied 592 supervisory board members 
in the 29 largest German banks, a “pronounced difference” was found “in the 
finance and management experience of board representatives across private 
and state-owned banks”80. Based on their data, they concluded that 
“supervisory board incompetence is related to losses in the financial crisis. 
Improved bank governance is therefore a suitable policy objective to reduce 
bank fragility.”81 
For future regulatory directions, T. Kick et al., for instance, study 
explicit regulatory intervention data among German banks during 1994-2008, 
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and conclude that “concerted micro- and macro-prudential policies are key to 
facilitate distressed bank recovery.”82 Therefore, their study hints that the 
German post-crisis recovery does not only depend on raising the individual 
skill level of relevant actors, but also the efficiency of over all regulatory 
policy. 
Conclusively, the principal concept of embracing liberal markets, with 
as little state intervention as possible, has certainly still a much clearer role 
within the German economy. Nevertheless, systematic as well as institutional 
changes are no doubt under way. This is likely to be relevant in both German 
domestic, as well international economic spheres. If, at all, a domestic vs. 
international delineation can be correct anymore- especially with regard to 
globalized financial markets. 
 
4.5 Post-Crisis Japan 
 
As the subprime mortgage crisis evolved into full scale financial crisis, the 
Japanese experience with the Asian crisis became an important reference 
point. For example, when E. S. Rosengren, the CEO of the Federal Reserve 
Bank of Boston, gave a speech in front of the Institute of International Bankers 
in March 2009, he repeatedly compared the Japanese experience to the current 
crisis.83 
 From the Japan’s post-crisis perspective, such a “phenomenon” 
provides its markets additional attention. Not only can the Japanese financial 
system offer experience with regard to appropriate policy measures, but it 
could also be hypothesized that due to their past experience, the Japanese 
economy was more prepared for the global Great Recession. However, beyond 
a mere hypothesis, most of the literature seems to deduce otherwise. Thus, 
while comparing the five economies within this paper, Japan seems to still 
stand in a relatively poor position. 
Garret, G. (2010) states in his study regarding the world after the 
financial crisis, that “the financial crisis exposed Japan’s economic recovery 
from the lost decade of the 1990s as being more apparent than real, built on 
booming exports to the US and China rather than the reforms so desperately 
needed at home.”84 He goes further by stating that “the suffocating legacies of 
massive public debt, sclerotic regulation and an aging and shrinking 
population will likely consign Japan’s next decade to a painful process of 
managing long-term economic decline.”85 Herein, Garret’s reference to the 
public debt problems is rather on point, as the Japanese net debt is estimated to 
reach 240 percent of its GDP by 2014 (see Table 1.5). 
 Nevertheless, not all the scholars agree that the debt issue will harm 
Japan, as the yields of the Japanese bonds remain healthy, and the stimulus 
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packages have managed to avoid a financial meltdown.86 Yet, this is not to say 
that the post-crisis conditions would not have harmed Japan’s long-term 
prospects. E.g. Tokuaka, K. (2010) concludes that one of Japan’s major 
problems is the massive population aging, which risks its long tradition of 
financing public debt “in a smooth manner”. Therefore, after the economic 
conditions have stabilized, a “sound public debt management and fiscal 
consolidation will be critical” to reduce the risk of a public debt default, and 
thus, a potential breakdown of Japan’s macro economy.87 
 Conclusively, while considering that Japan faces a large amount of 
public debt next to its post-crisis’ struggling export sector, its stability seems 
rather fragile. As Japan’s economy entered the recession after barely 
recovering from the “lost decade”, its stabilization-period was rather short. 
Subsequently, although the boom created some “breathing space” as financial 
regulations became more lax and the government’s inadequate policy 
interventions less frequent, the current post-crisis picture is still rather 
troublesome. This is mostly so due to the fact that the necessary structural 
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“From being a rounding error a decade ago, the financial clout of China now 
trails only that of America.”88 
 
5.1 Regulatory Reforms 
 
Over the past three decades, China’s financial markets have become 
increasingly liberalized.89 After the moderate banking reforms were introduced 
in 1980s, the 1990s introduced a fast transformation from the former Special 
Banks (SBs) into state-owned commercial banks (known as the Big Four).  
After China was accepted to WTO in 2001, the reforms were carried further: 
as the membership of WTO required opening the market to foreign 
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corporations, China became impelled to raise the competitive standards for the 
Big Four- the gigantic state owned commercial banks.90 Without attempting to 
map all the outcomes of the financial reforms, some major implications will 
herein follow. 
First, once China recognized that global trade poses great potential, 
explicit policy initiatives redefined its financial priorities. In 1990s, one of the 
major benchmarks was “paving the way to WTO accession”, which among 
several other aspects, provided incentives to reform the mono-bank system.91 
For the Chinese financial architecture, this meant a remarkable revolution. 
According to Charles L. Kwong, “the aim was to achieve at least three major 
goals: (1) to develop the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) into an independent 
and fully fledged modern central bank to regulate the national financial market 
and maintain macroeconomic stability, (2) to commercialize the four SBs by 
separating commercial lending from policy lending, and (3) to nourish a more 
diverse and competitive banking sector by allowing more commercial banks to 
enter the market.”92 
Globally, perhaps the biggest impact of the redefined markets was 
posed by international competition.93 After its accession to WTO in 2001, 
China was given 5 years to completely open up the markets to foreign 
financial corporations. To the state owned commercial banks, this meant 
strong incentives for increasing efficiency. For other market-participants, the 
foreign competition diversified options due to the emergence of a competitive 
credit market. 
Second, after the financial reforms became rapid in the first half of 
2000s, the real economy began to post stronger results. For example, the 
amount of non-performing loans (NPLs) issued by the Big Four, which peaked 
25% at the end of 1990s, was brought down to 21.4% by the end of 2003.94 
Despite remaining exceptionally high for “western” standards, this was a 
victory for the Chinese policy makers. 
Third, the once fundamentally communist mono-bank system was 
largely replaced by a capitalist financial market. Before the crisis struck, the 
government control gradually drifted, especially since considerable fractions 
of the Big Four were separated from direct government control, and 
international banks started to conduct business in renminbis. Moreover, in 
2007, right before the financial turmoil, the Chinese government supported the 
Bank of China and the China Construction Bank with $45 billion from its 
foreign exchange reserves to become joint-stock companies, which would 
“soon be placed in the stock exchange”. 95 According to Yao, Chunxia, and 
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Feng, this was “by far the boldest and toughest decision of the government to 
convert the big state banks into truly commercial institutions”. 
Nevertheless, once China’s economy experienced setbacks due to the 
recent crisis, the Chinese government used its control over the banking 
industry and “strongly advised” the SOCBs to extend loans for small and 
medium size companies96. From the perspective of avoiding massive 
bankruptcies, the steps were certainly justified. Ibid, it also presented the 
government influence over the seemingly independent banking sector. For the 
developed economies, no such “advices” could have ever worked. Did the 
Chinese system have an advantage? 
While considering the inefficiencies within the system, the quasi-
communist system’s advantages, even if present in current crisis, are certainly 
implicit, and mostly illusory. However, from the perspective of effectively 
manipulating with the market and “forcing” stability through artificial policy 
measures, the governments’ work has arguably been successful. Nevertheless, 
several controversies, that ultimately are likely to undermine the long-term 
stability, can be identified. The following section will consider two of the 
perhaps most controversial measures that are likely to challenge the Chinese 
official policy beyond simply reforming the financial regulations. 
 
5.2 Exchange Rate Control and Current Account Surplus 
 
As stated above, although the Chinese economy has become substantially less 
government-influenced, the financial issues, including the Chinese monetary 
policy, are reluctant to change. James A. Dorn (2008), a scholar from Towson 
University and an editor of the Cato Institute, argues for instance, that China 
still lacks explicit mechanisms for affecting monetary variables (i.e. the 
exchange rate, interest rates), whereas the central government determines most 
of the “macroeconomic prices”. Thus, while regarding the macro market, it is 
important to recognize that the quasi-communist system influences virtually 
all of China’s economic determinants, including their monetary policy. 
First, to understand the crux of China’s monetary issues beyond just 
noting its socialist characteristics, the exchange rate policy needs to be 
examined. According to J. A. Dorn, “China will be able to have an 
independent monetary policy aimed at long-run price stability, which fosters 
financial stability, only if it floats the yuan and eventually allows full 
convertibility.”97 This is supported by M. Wolf, who argues that the begged 
renminbi is unsustainable next to the surplus-created “savings glut” for both 
the Chinese and its trading partners98. Yet, China disagrees. Just recently, 
while responding to Obama-administration’s accusations of “exchange rate 
protectionism”, the Chinese officials delivered a clear response by accusing 
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the US administration in “trade protectionism.”99 What is their rationale for 
disagreeing with both the scholarly and political elite of most of the developed 
economies? 
Although the answer is multifaceted, several key reasons prevail. 
Perhaps two of the most important reasons are China’s need to keep the cost of 
exports down (in 2008, 33% of China’s GDP was exported), and control 
inflation.100 Herein, the usage of “sterilization” mechanisms is what links the 
fixed exchange rate to the crux of China’s monetary policy determinants.101 As 
the sterilization process crowds out capital, the government creates a similar 
effect to a mere increase of interest rates- with the exception that domestic 
money demand is not altered, whereas money supply is being constantly 
distorted through government interventions. 
Arguably up to today, China’s policy has been serving its economic 
interest. They have managed to keep the inflation under reasonable control, 
exports have been increasingly competitive, and the economy has kept on 
expanding. At the same time, as they adopted the “policy of gradual renminbi 
appreciation” in 2005, the currency rose by 21% up to July 2008, and thus 
lowered the inflationary pressure quite successfully.102 Additionally, the 
excess savings have yielded sufficient interest on global markets (see Table 
5.1).103 Hence, before the crisis hit, manipulating the exchange rate had an 
important role for China’s economy in continuing the economy’s expansion. 
From the post-crisis perspective, however, the effects of a begged 
currency and the sterilization-policy may not be as clear anymore. Greenwood, 
for instance, argues that the budget surplus has “by any standard, […] a very 
substantial magnitude, and will have large consequences for both China’s 
trading partners as well as for China itself.”104 Scholars from China’s Hunan 
University add to the idea with their statistical analysis on “China’s implicit 
demand for foreign reserves” by concluding that in the long-run, “the 
neutralization policy leads to growth in foreign exchange reserves that seem 
limitless”, which are “ultimately inconsistent.”105    
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Today, according to Wai-chung Lo, and Michael C.M. Ng, as the recent credit 
crisis has posed the fragility of the “modern” financial system, there are no 
more models to set as an example- especially given that the Chinese financial 
system proved to be a lot more resilient during the crisis. At the same time, 
however, they also admit that the state controlled system creates “complex 
dynamics” among “the state management, and the board”, which may cause 
inefficient governance, and thus harm the banks’ ability to conduct their 
business effectively.107  
Pro re nata, the authors note that as the financial crisis “is a recent 
demonstration of the opportunistic, manipulative behavior of bank managers”, 
the Chinese-exercised state intervention might play a somewhat effective 
(disciplinary) role after all.108 Ironically, this is supported by the fact that 
although the Anglo-Saxon liberal financial system has mostly been considered 
the financial role-model, the Chinese state controlled banking sector has 
proven greater resilience throughout the Great Recession. Albeit, if resilience 
is left aside, since it may be explained apart from the structure of the financial 
system (i.e. the amount of reserves available), cost efficiency of the semi-
socialist financial model is still rather poor. 
It is true that the reforms of China’s monetary system have 
significantly improved the sector’s performance. It is also true that throughout 
the credit crisis, the Chinese government control managed to maintain the 
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commercial banks’ credit supply and thus protect China’s businesses from 
global shocks better than most of the developed economies could. 
Nevertheless, as the non-performing loan rates are still high and the 
government continues subsequently to bail out the national commercial banks 
on a regular basis, it is not clear at all, whether the system’s long-term 
sustainability is secure.109 
S. Yao, Z. Han and G. Feng admit that the recent bank reforms, 
especially after China’s accession to WTO in 2001, have brought about 
efficiency and decreased the problem of non-performing loans.110 At the same 
time, they also point out that it is mainly the result of reducing government 
influence on active bank management. Paradoxically, this hints that although 
the recent crisis has undermined the credibility of the “western” financial 
industry, most of the increase in China’s financial sector’s efficiency is still 





Being carried by the spirit of Barth, Capri, and Levine who once stated that 
future research should “trace the forces shaping the evolution of bank 
regulations and supervision,”112 the goal of this study has been to observe 
recent financial crisis’ impact on the international willingness to enhance 
global financial regulations. More specifically, the central research question 
was stated to explore, whether the economic status quo incentivizes the 
creation of enhanced international financial regulations. 
 After choosing UK, USA, Germany, Japan, and China as the basis for 
this particular study, the goal has been to test the research question in the 
context of the five respective countries. Herein, 3 subject areas were chosen as 
gateways for a structured approach: regulatory reforms; an internationally 
distinguishing variable; and post-crisis conditions. In order to evaluate the 
findings with respect to the research question (whether there are incentives for 
enhance international financial regulations), conclusions will now be made 
about the international implications with regard to each gateway. Later, a 
general conclusion will follow. 
 First, regulatory reforms- a subject area that ended up circling 
dominantly around two terms: market liberalization and regulatory 
convergence. With regard to the two terms, several groups formed. Germany, 
Japan and United Kingdom, for example were similar with regard to the 
convergence trend. All of the three economies had either completely or to a 
great extent, merged the financial regulators into a single regulatory agency. 
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China’s quasi-communist system could also qualify as a single authority 
regulating the financial markets. However, China has never had more than one 
regulator. Therefore, China’s regulatory agency that is often intertwined with 
government’s politics represents a separate category. And lastly, the United 
States, which has chosen not to merge regulatory agencies and therefore 
continues with system that other economies have abandoned. 
 At the same time, with regard to market liberalization, different types 
of groups have formed. The Anglo Saxon economies with their market-based 
financial systems stand somewhat separately from the bank-based German and 
Japanese systems. Herein, China is again a separate entity, as it has only 
recently chosen to move somewhat away from the fundamentally communist 
model. While solely observing the liberalization trend, however, all of the 
economies seem to be reconsidering the process of deregulation in response to 
the financial innovation that got out of control during the boom. 
 Second, the internationally distinguishing variables represented the 
variety of unique interests that every economy has in relation to international 
financial regulations. The Chinese fixed currency system creates considerable 
unbalances next to the large current account surplus that the country holds. 
With regard to Germany, its central role within Eurozone prescribes several 
international determinants that do not exist for Japan, for instance, which 
otherwise could be rather similar to the German bank-based system. 
Moreover, the current debt crises within Eurozone are a great example of the 
externalities that the German financial system must consider in order to secure 
itself a sustainable economic outlook in the long run. 
The Japanese power decline is another example of unique determinants 
that Japan will most likely be driven by (both positively and negatively). The 
UK’s and USA’s common interest in their financial industries, however, is 
probably likely to provide a common ground for the financial powerhouses 
with initiating some key regulatory measures. 
 Third, the post-crises conditions which group the governments of 
Japan, UK, and USA due to their bailout packages, government stimulus 
plans, and subsequently looming national debt. Lastly, under the post-crises 
section, Germany and China stand somewhat close, as their current account 
surpluses keep on crowding out capital. 
 Therefore, over all, different areas interconnect the economies interests 
differently. With regard to the necessity to reduce budget deficits as well as to 
reverse the excessive deregulation, the economies appear to hold most of the 
common ground. However, China with its inherently different economic 
system, as well as the options that it holds to the foreign reserves and rather 
good ability to weather the crisis, stands out most separately. 
 Thus, while asking whether the five economies would be genuinely 
interested in enhanced global financial regulations, Germany, Japan, UK, and 
USA would most likely be incentivized more, although their own interests 
might in times conflict with each-other. China, however, with the fixed 
exchange rate policy and still continuing savings glut contribution, might not 
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be as clearly motivated. Nevertheless, since most of the Chinese economic 
power stems from global trade, it still must be interested in a stable 
environment. Therefore, although regulatory compromises might be most 
difficult to achieve with China, they should not be impossible. 
 In conclusion, while considering the probable benefits of the study, it 
has hopefully taken a step closer towards a more comprehensive grasp of the 
global financial system, and the multiplicity of denominators that underlie 
within the system. 
 Additionally, this study could be used for pursuing with a more precise 
depiction of the broad and perhaps somewhat vague scope that has been 
covered within this paper. Few of the many possible research directions will 
herein follow: a more accurate, concise and detailed assessment of these 
economic systems within the context of international economic cooperation; 
quantitative studies measuring the impacts of the gateways (i.e. measuring 
budget deficits, financial sector capitalization, financial market performance, 
interest rate movements, and other macroeconomic variables in relation to 
participation in international regulatory reform initiatives- e.g. the fulfillment 
of Basel Accord); focusing on explicit aspects within the study: i.e. banking 
sector performance across countries in comparison to the international 
regulatory commitments that countries have taken; etc. 
  All in all, since the topic of international financial regulations is broad 
and ambiguous, the ultimate goal of future research papers should be to isolate 
small, but comprehensive variables, and then study the changes with regard to 
the variables in a concise manner. Case studies certainly serve as healthy 
options for such a strategy- however, case studies as well, should, in my 
opinion, be designed as compact as possible in order to have hope for 
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